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Social capital as a coping mechanism for seasonal deprivation: The case of the Monga in 
Bangladesh  
 
Abstract The extreme hunger and deprivation that recurs every year in the lean season in 
northern Bangladesh, locally known as the Monga, is mainly due to the malfunctioning local 
labor and credit markets. Using data covering 5,600 extreme poor households in the Monga-
prone region, we investigate in detail the role of social capital in securing employment and 
obtaining informal loans. Correcting for the endogeneity of social capital by the 
heteroscedasticity-based method proposed by Klein and Vella (2010) and also by the standard 
IV method for a robustness check, we document that social capital plays an important role in 
obtaining both wage- and self-employment. We also document a weak negative effect of social 
capital on obtaining informal loans. We explain our results in terms of the role of horizontal 
and vertical components of our measures of social capital in influencing different outcomes.   
 
Keywords Monga, extreme seasonality, social capital, heteroscedasticity, employment, 
informal loan. 
JEL Classification I32, G21, P46. 
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1 Introduction 
Seasonality in employment and income of the rural households in developing countries 
is well-known. Typically caused by rain-dependence in agriculture (Chaudhury and Paxson 
2002), seasonality in employment and income may sometimes be extreme enough to result in 
starvation and hunger. Malfunctioning of the rural labor and credit markets, which severely 
constrains consumption smoothing across seasons, is the primary reason behind these 
employment and income fluctuations (Sen 1981; Paxson 1993; Jacoby and Skoufias 1998). The 
Monga in northern Bangladesh is a unique example of such extreme seasonality.1 It is a near-
famine situation in the lean season that recurs almost every year from mid-September to mid-
November and is the main cause of plummeting employment and credit opportunities for the 
extreme poor in the pre-harvesting period of the Aman crop (the main rice crop in Bangladesh) 
(Sen 1981; Rahman 1995; Berg and Emran 2011).2 The contraction of the rural economic 
activity and the resulting lack of employment opportunities during the Monga not only reduce 
the possibility of selling labor in the spot market but also lower the proceeds of advance sales 
of labor in the future market to as low as 50% of those in the spot market. This situation is 
exacerbated by the absence of the rural credit markets, both formal and informal, thus 
increasing the need for effective consumption smoothing (Pitt and Khandker 2002; Amin, Rai 
                                                     
1 Monga is a Bengali dialect word referring to unemployment, food scarcity, hunger and starvation in 
northern Bangladesh. Khandker (2011) describes the Monga as a period of virtual economic inactivity 
and seasonal food deprivation, which sometimes rises to the level of famine.  
 
2 In studying the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, Sen (1981) documented that, at the peak of the Monga, 
employment dropped to as low as 10% of the previous three-month average. Wage laborers and 
several service providers (such as boatmen and petty traders) whose livelihood depends on daily 
wages suffered the most. This resulted in a decline of “entitlement” of food, causing starvation and 
death. As much as 45% victims of the famine were day laborers, while small farmers (owning less 
than 0.5 acre of land) constituted a further 39%. 
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and Topa 2003). The Monga has been a grave policy concern for the government of Bangladesh 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
This paper investigates the role of social capital, a non-standard factor endowment, in 
securing employment and informal loans for the extreme poor during the Monga. We interpret 
the improved employment and informal loan opportunities of the extreme poor during this 
period as indicators of their reduced exposure to hunger and famine. Consequently, our analysis 
adopts various employment indicators, such as wage-employment and self-employment, and 
loan indicators as outcome variables. Our focus on informal borrowing is predicated on the fact 
that the extreme poor in Bangladesh are invariably denied access to formal financial institutions 
(Amin, Rai and Topa 2003; Mallick 2013). 
The extreme poor comprise 25% of the population in Bangladesh and 40% of the 
population in the northern districts. Given their weak economic potential and almost non-
existent physical or human capital, or other form of productive assets, the extreme poor are the 
most vulnerable to the Monga. A comparison between the extreme poor and the average poor, 
who are typically targeted by NGOs, is instructive in illustrating the plight of the extreme poor 
(see Appendix A.1). While an average NGO-borrower poor person owns approximately 87 
decimals of land, an extreme poor person owns only 4 decimals. The latter is no more than a 
homestead; 47% of the extreme poor own no land at all. The value of the dwelling house 
(excluding land), which can be considered as a proxy for non-land asset value, is approximately 
8,000 and 1,200 Taka for the NGO-targeted poor and extreme poor, respectively. Moreover, 
although the average poor can borrow through microfinance programs, the extreme poor are 
excluded from these schemes because of their lack of creditworthiness. The extreme poor also 
lack human capital endowment. For example, the household head in an extreme poor household 
has only 0.53 years of schooling compared to 2.86 years for an NGO-targeted poor household. 
As a more existential comparison, per capita consumption for the NGO-targeted poor is 2,284 
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calories per day, while more than 50% of the extreme poor cannot even manage food twice a 
day. All these features make the extreme poor the most vulnerable to the Monga.  
Given the lack of physical and human capital, social capital is the only form of capital 
that the extreme poor can possibly own. The proponents of social capital argue that such assets 
as networks, trust, and reciprocity assist households greatly during economic hardships and 
shocks (Durkheim 1895; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). For example, social capital helps 
economic exchange, particularly in agrarian societies where formal institutions are largely 
absent (Bardhan 1984; Basu 1986). Although many useful roles played by social capital are 
documented [Bakshi, Mallick, and Ulubaşoğlu (2015) provide a review], its role in mitigating 
the adverse effect of the Monga remains unexplored in the literature.  
We define social capital as social characteristics that enable an individual to benefit 
from information flows and to reap the market and non-market returns from interaction with 
others. To measure the social capital of a household, we consider three distinct types of social 
interactions: i) help received from non-relative neighbors, ii) invitation received from non-
relative neighbors, and iii) participation in the shalish (a social system for informal adjudication 
of petty disputes by community members), all in the past one year. This information is recorded 
in the survey as binary responses (yes or no). Although information about repeated interactions, 
if any, is not available, the incidence of interactions can arguably provide a sufficient sense of 
whether an extreme poor household can be considered to own social capital. In our data, 27%, 
16%, and 13% of the extreme poor households received any invitation and help and participated 
in shalish, respectively. These figures clearly demonstrate that social capital is not a resource 
widely available across the extreme poor but a scarce asset, like other types of economic 
resources. Each of the above indicators is linked to social capital theory, and, therefore, we 
investigate their individual roles separately. Section 3 discusses in detail that all three measures 
of social capital capture the horizontal social network in terms of interactions among the 
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extreme poor; however, participation in shalish additionally captures the vertical social 
network in terms of interactions of the extreme poor with the rural elites.  
Our analysis exploits rich household and village level survey data for 5,600 extreme 
poor households from 156 villages in three Monga-prone districts in northern Bangladesh. The 
endogeneity of social capital is a methodological challenge. One of the causes of endogeneity 
is omitted variables, which simultaneously affect social capital, employment, and informal 
borrowing during the Monga. We control for a multitude of explanatory variables to control 
for the observable characteristics, including the available physical and human capital, 
demographic and economic conditions at the household level, and physical infrastructure at the 
village level. However, unobservable characteristics, such as ability, entrepreneurship, or risk-
taking behavior of the household members, may influence both the outcome variables and the 
level of social capital. Another source of potential endogeneity is the reverse causality, in that 
current employment and financial transactions may also create social capital. Measurement 
errors in social capital cannot be ruled out as well, because social capital is broad concept for 
which we use some proxies.  
To address the endogeneity of social capital, we employ two alternative identification 
strategies. The first is a heteroscedasticity-based approach proposed by Klein and Vella (2009; 
2010) that does not rely on exclusion restrictions. This is our main identification strategy. To 
check for robustness, we also employ the instrumental variable-based identification method, 
with our instrumental variable (IV) being the number of open-access resources in the 
neighborhood of the extreme poor. Conditional on the covariates, this IV categorizes the 
households into different groups with randomly varying access to social capital construction 
platforms, hence usefully identifying the unbiased effect of social capital (see Section 5.3 for 
details). We find that the IV results support the results based on the heteroscedasticity-based 
identification.  
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Our results document that all three measures of social capital increase the likelihood of 
self-employment. Given the small-scale self-employment activities undertaken by the extreme 
poor (see Appendix A.3 for a detailed list), the market for their products and services is also 
targeted to similar extreme poor households. Greater social capital provides better information 
about the market (potential customers and their locations), and, consequently, increases the 
profitability of self-employed activities. On the other hand, only participation in shalish has a 
significant effect on wage-employment. This result is understandable from the vertical aspect 
of social capital generated from participation in shalish. Since potential employers of the 
extreme poor come from the upper hierarchy in the community (rich households), rather than 
other extreme poor, households with networks with the upper hierarchy are more likely to be 
wage-employed. Quantifying the effect, participating in shalish increases female wage-
employment during the Monga that can be translated into an income increase equivalent to 30 
kilograms of coarse rice at the prevailing market price. However, social capital has a (weak) 
negative effect on the probability of obtaining informal loans. The reason is intuitive. Given 
that the higher degree of social capital increases the likelihood of both self- and wage-
employment opportunities, households are less likely to resort to informal loan in times of 
distress during the Monga.  
This paper makes several distinct contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the only study that investigates the role of social capital in combating the 
Monga. Second, we study the extreme poor because they are the cohort most vulnerable to the 
Monga. The facts that the extreme poor are typically illiterate and lack access to alternative 
sources of information, such as NGO or radio/TV, offer the major advantage that the effects of 
social capital are unlikely to be confounded by other sources of information. Third, we address 
the endogeneity of social capital through a multi-pronged approach. Prior studies on social 
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capital have categorically ignored this problem, raising serious doubts about the reliability of 
their estimates.  
Our work is situated in a burgeoning literature that finds a strong connection between 
social capital and household well-being during economic hardships. While this literature 
investigates the role of social capital in mitigating idiosyncratic shocks, our study explores the 
same effect in the context of an aggregate shock that occurs at the regional level. Our work 
also resembles Berg and Emran (2011), who demonstrate an important role for microfinance 
in reducing the adverse effects of the Monga. We differ from their study in terms of our focus 
on social capital and the extreme poor, who are typically excluded from the microfinance 
program.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background for the 
Monga problem. Section 3 discusses measurement of social capital for the extreme poor in the 
context of rural Bangladesh. Section 4 explains the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 
presents our estimation and identification strategies.  Section 6 discusses the results based on 
OLS and instrumental variable estimations. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
 
2 Background and the Monga  
Approximately 75 million people in Bangladesh live under conditions of poverty, hunger, 
and consumption rationing (FAO 2010). The extreme poor lack productive assets, depend on 
an irregular daily wage income, face severe income shocks, and are, overall, the cohort most 
vulnerable to hunger and food insecurity (Halder and Mosley 2004). The situation is worse in 
the northern part of the country, where incidence of poverty is significantly higher and income 
seasonality is much more pronounced. For example, in 2005 approximately 56% of the 
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population in the greater Rangpur region3 lived below the poverty line and 40% lived under 
conditions of extreme poverty (Khandker, Khalily and Samad 2010), while the national 
averages in 2006 were 40% and 28.6%, respectively (BBS 2006). The northern districts also 
lag behind the rest of the country in terms of other development indicators.  Per capita income 
is as low as 71%, the share of manufacturing is only 10% (BBS 2002), and the daily wage rate 
is 28% lower than the national average (Khandker, Khalily and Samad 2010). This situation 
exacerbates the vulnerability of food provision for agricultural day laborers during the lean 
season, resulting in a famine-like situation. Households opt for advance sale of crops and labor 
at unfavorable terms, leading to chronic poverty. For example, a day-laborer receives as little 
as 50% from selling advance labor as would be received in the spot market (Rahman 1995). 
The Monga occurs between two harvesting periods every year in five northern districts—
Kurigram, Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, and Rangpur—in the Rangpur division.4 The 
harvesting periods in Bangladesh are divided into two major cropping seasons—Aus and Aman. 
The Aus starts in April, and harvesting takes place in July–August. However, the main crop is 
Aman, comprising the period from July to December. The Monga occurs during September–
November, when the stock of Aus runs out before the Aman harvesting starts in December. 
October–November are the hardest months for the extreme poor, due to severely reduced 
                                                     
3 Rangpur is one of the seven administrative divisions in Bangladesh (also a district in the same 
division). 
 
4 See Rahman (1995); Hossain (1988); Faridi and Khalily (2008); Rahman, Matsui and Ikemoto 
(2008); Shahriar and Khalily (2008); Khandker, Khalily and Samad (2010); Berg and Emran (2011); 
Khandker (2011). Rahman (1995) is the pioneering work on the Monga. 
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employment and food scarcity.5 Since the extreme poor do not own an asset base and cannot 
save over the non-lean season, their ability to cope with the massive employment drop during 
the Monga is constrained significantly. 
Because the local labor and credit markets either do not function properly or are absent 
altogether, governmental and non-governmental transfers become important for the subsistence 
of the extreme poor in the Monga region. The government, along with some NGOs, has 
undertaken various social safety net programs, including Vulnerable Group Feeding and 
Vulnerable Group Development programs, during employment and income fluctuations. 
Despite such efforts, 9.3 million poor, including those in the Monga region, are still excluded 
from these safety net programs (World Food Programme 2010).  
 
3 Measuring social capital  
Social capital is a broad concept and, therefore, a precise definition depends on the 
specific context. We define social capital as social characteristics that enable an individual to 
benefit from information flows and to reap the market and non-market returns from interaction 
with others. This definition is slightly narrower than the one espoused by Glaeser, Laibson and 
Sacerdote (2002) and Karlan (2005).   
Given our context, we measure social capital generating information flow and 
networking by three distinct attributes: i) help from non-relative neighbors, ii) invitation to visit 
non-relative neighbors, and iii) participation in shalish, all in the last one year. 6  The 
                                                     
5 This period is also termed as the Mora Kartik. Mora means “dead” in Bengali, and Kartik is a month 
in Bengali calendar (mid-October to mid-November). Mora Kartik implies the deadliness of the Kartik 
month.  
 
6 There is no clear agreement on the measurement of social capital. The literature commonly uses 
some proxies that track the individuals’ participation in community events. The following are some 
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information is recorded as a binary response; we assign a value of 1 to each “yes” answer and 
a value of 0 to each “no” answer. However, information on the identity of 
individuals/households who either extended help, invitation to visit, or requested to participate 
in shalish to the extreme poor was not recorded.  
Help includes i) cooked food and food items, such as rice, salt, eggs, pulses, and spices, 
as either a gift or a loan; ii) accompaniment to visit the doctor, hospital, and pharmacy; iii) 
assistance in trading productive assets, such as cattle and trees; and iv) information about jobs, 
relief, and informal loans. These types of help manifest the extreme poor’s participation in the 
social network with compassion, support, attachment, commitment, and reciprocity, and, thus, 
represent a bonding relationship (Szreter and Woolcock 2004; Harper and Kelly 2003; Heany 
and Israel 2002; Coleman 1988). The extreme poor usually receive help from 
individuals/households of similar socio-economic status. Therefore, help captures the 
horizontal social network.   
Invitation is usually received from individuals or households of similar socio-economic 
status, thus capturing the horizontal social network. This measure is more pertinent in the 
current context, since the sample households consist of only the extreme poor. It needs to be 
stressed that, in order to be invited by non-relatives, the relationship must be both strong and 
based on mutual trust and recognition. Invitation, therefore, indicates that the individual is 
included and valued in the community (Baum and Ziersch 2003; Goodman et al. 1998). 
                                                     
examples of the proxies for social capital: Kawachi (1999)—membership in groups, civic trust, and 
helpfulness of others; Islam et al. (2008)—voter turnout and crime rates; Veenstra (2000)—voting, 
writing letters to editors, paying attention to the community, and socialization with colleagues at 
work; Hyyppä and Mäki (2001)—different participating activities; Campbell, Williams and Gilgen 
(2002)—members of the local sporting clubs; Latkin et al. (2003)—church attendance; Gayen and 
Raeside (2007)—networking and social relationships; Waterkeyn and Cairncross (2005)—club 
membership; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)—blood donation. 
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Shalish is a social system designed to settle petty disputes in the community without 
resorting to costly legal procedures. The system reprimands and punishes an individual who 
violates certain norms and values of the society. The extreme poor are usually invited to 
participate in shalish by their peers to support their cause, thus representing the horizontal 
social network. However, unlike the other two measures, participation in shalish has an 
additional dimension. Traditionally, the rural elite, which includes rich, socially and politically 
influential persons, and elected local government representatives, always present in the shalish 
as power brokers and to give the final verdict. Therefore, attending shalish provides an 
opportunity for the extreme poor to interact with individuals of upper hierarchies in the 
community, although their interactions may not always be on equal terms. Therefore, attending 
shalish also represents a vertical social network.  
It is important to bear in mind that, although both horizontal and vertical networks help 
disseminate information, the type of information may depend on access to the type of networks. 
For example, horizontal networks, in terms of interactions among the extreme poor, are less 
likely to provide information about potential job opportunities; rather, interactions with rich 
people, who are potential employers, may provide such information.  
Although the data do not allow to separate out ex ante the horizontal and vertical nature 
of interactions, our results can still shed light on these interactions, depending on which 
measure of social capital influences the outcome variables. 
It is important to issue a caveat that information flow and network channels of social 
capital may reduce moral hazard and hold-up problems and, thus, can increase one’s bargaining 
power. We do not investigate these channels in detail, mainly because of the lack of data. For 
example, we do not have data on either the frequency of interactions or the durability of the 
relationship, which would help measure the extent to which moral hazard and hold-up problems 
are reduced. In addition, bargaining power is not quite a relevant concern for the extreme poor. 
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Moreover, any potential sources of bargaining power, such as education and land ownership, 
is already controlled for in our estimations and, hence, are orthogonal to our social capital 
measurement. Therefore, we focus only on the broader channels that our measures of social 
capital capture.  
 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
Data were collected in 2002 as a part of a baseline survey for BRAC’s “Challenging 
the Frontier of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFPR/TUP)” program in three 
northern districts in Bangladesh (Rangpur, Kurigram, and Nilphamari).7 All three districts are 
in the Monga region. The extreme poor in each village were identified through the participatory 
wealth ranking (PWR) exercises by the community members. 8  One-third of the program 
villages were randomly selected, and all extreme poor households therein were surveyed. The 
total sample size is 5,600 households drawn from 156 villages. The collected information 
includes demographic characteristics; economic endowments, such as income, landholding and 
dwelling conditions; social capital; labor force participation; organizational membership; and 
village level infrastructure. Data were collected in February–March during the post-harvest 
season after the Monga.9 Appendix A.3 provides a detailed list of wage- and self-employment 
                                                     
7 The households were revisited in 2005 and 2008, but these panel data cannot be used to investigate 
the effect of social capital. The extreme poor were provided, among other assistance, support for 
building social capital for approximately two years. Therefore, the contribution of social capital 
cannot be disentangled from the program impact. Baseline data are immune to this problem. 
 
8 For a detailed discussion on the PWR method and the selection of households, see Matin and Halder 
(2007).  
9 Since data were collected in one round, consumption and income across seasons cannot be 
compared. 
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activities. Borrowing during the Monga is calculated from the information on the timing of 
borrowing.  
    Insert Table 1 here 
 
The descriptive statistics on employment status, lean season borrowing, and other key 
variables are presented in Table 1. The number of household members employed (full time or 
part time) during the Monga is, on average, 2.15, which is 61% of the household size.10 At first 
glance, it might seem that a large percentage of the household members are employed, but only 
an average of 1.02 household members obtain wage-employment during the Monga, and the 
proportion of self-employed is almost equal. The percentage of males who are wage-employed 
is higher than that of females, while the percentage of females who are self-employed is higher 
than that of males. The latter is due to the fact that livestock and poultry rearing are the main 
self-employment categories that are traditionally filled by females within the household. Only 
7.7% of the households have NGO membership. The average age of the household head is 43 
years, with 69% of them being male. Only 5% of the households have managed to receive 
informal loans, with the average amount of such loans being approximately 1,500 Taka.11  
 
                                                     
10 We do not have disaggregated employment data, such as the number of hours a day and the number 
of days a month worked. It is important to note that respondents cannot recall such details of past 
employment. Therefore, we cannot distinguish full-time and part-time employment from the data. 
Information on location of employment is also not available, so we are unable to determine migration 
patterns during the Monga. However, the poor in our sample region hardly migrate, considering the 
associated uncertainty of finding a job in the new destination and the economic consequences of 
borrowing and spending money to travel to the destination (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2014). 
 
11 At the 2002 exchange rate, one US dollar was approximately equal to 60 Taka.  
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5 Empirical specification and identification  
In the following, we first present our empirical specification and discuss the choice of the 
control variables that separate the effect of social capital from other confounding factors. Social 
capital is likely to be endogenous, for the reasons mentioned in the Introduction. We address 
this problem by using two alternative methods. The first is heteroscedasticity-based 
identification proposed by Klein and Vella (2009; 2010), which does not require exclusion 
restrictions; this is our main identification strategy. The second is the conventional instrumental 
variables-based identification strategy with exclusion restrictions, which we employ as a 
robustness check.  
 
5.1 Empirical specification 
We estimate the following linear equation: 
                            i i iY Sα β ε′= + + +iδ X ,                     (1) 
where iY  is a set of dependent variables, iS  is social capital, and iX  is a vector of control 
variables.  In equation (1), our main focus is on β .  
The vector of controls iX  includes an array of variables to aid a clean interpretation of
β . These variables pertain to demographic and economic characteristics of the households, 
such as gender, age, education (years of schooling) and marital status of the household head, 
family size, amount of land owned, health condition (self-reported), women’s mobility outside 
the home, and NGO membership. Education is intended to control for human capital, while 
land ownership is intended to control for physical capital. Household size controls for labor 
endowment of the household. A larger household size might also create more social capital, as 
it leads to more interactions outside the home. Age, health condition, marital status, and 
women’s mobility outside the home often influence both employment decisions and loans 
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received by the household.  In addition to access to loans, NGO membership plays an important 
role in creating social capital. For example, microcredit operations are performed in peer 
groups, which create and extend personal networks among the members. The average annual 
wage rates in the village for male and female laborers capture the shadow price of labor. The 
developed physical infrastructure facilitates communication and economic opportunities at the 
village level. To account for this potential effect, we control for the village level physical 
infrastructure, such as the distance of the village from the Upazilla (sub-district headquarters) 
and an all-weather road and the availability of electricity. Village level variables also account 
for any non-randomness in program placement, since the data came from BRAC’s TUP 
program.  
 
5.2 Heteroscedasticity-based identification  
 Our main identification strategy is a variant of the approach proposed by Klein and 
Vella (2009; 2010).12 This method requires that the endogenous variable be binary. It exploits 
non-spherical disturbances arising in the determination of social capital. The primary intuition 
behind this identification is that, with substantial heteroscedasticity in the equation relating the 
endogenous variable to the exogenous variables, the changing variance in the residual acts as 
a “probabilistic shifter” of the endogenous variable. Analogous to the instrumental variables, 
this probabilistic shifter helps trace out the causal relationship between the dependent variable 
(employment or loan) and the endogenous variable (binary social capital). Consider the 
following equations:  
i i iY Sα β ε′= + + +iδ X        (2) 
i iS uµ ′= + +iγ X ,        (3) 
                                                     
12 This method has also been employed by Berg, Emran and Shilpi (2013).  
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where iY  is the employment or informal borrowing during the Monga and iS is the binary proxy 
for social capital (help, invitation, and shalish). The model does not satisfy the exclusion 
restriction. However, Klein and Vella argue that β can be estimated if the residuals iu are 
heteroscedastic. Assume that residuals are heteroscedastic in the following way: 
( )i u i iu S X u=  ,       (4) 
where iu is the zero mean homoscedastic residuals, iX  is a subset of (or equal to) iX , and 
( )u iS X  is a non-constant positive function. The probability of the binary endogenous indicator 
is given by 
  Pr( 1)
( )
p i
i
u i
XS P
S X
 
= =  
 


,     (5) 
where P(.) is the distribution function for iu . With homoscedastic errors, ( )u iS X  is a constant, 
and identification depends on possible non-linearity of the P(.) function, such as Normal 
distribution. However, this identification is based on the non-linearity in the tails of the 
distribution and, thus, relies on a small fraction of the data for identification. As such, 
identification based on the nonlinearity of the P(.) function is, in general, deemed as not being 
credible. In contrast, when there is heteroscedasticity, ( )u iS X  is not a constant function, and 
identification exploits data from the region where P(.) is linear. Therefore, the predicted 
probability of equation (5) works as a valid instrument of the binary endogenous variable, 
provided that there is heteroscedasticity in the residuals (Klein and Vella 2009; 2010).  
It is instructive to discuss why the social capital equation might exhibit 
heteroscedasticity in the first stage. For example, gender (or marital status) of the household 
head is meant to capture the average difference in social capital. Male and female (or married 
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vs. single) household heads are different groups, but there is enormous heterogeneity among 
each type of household head in terms of attitudes and entrepreneurship. Thus, while the discrete 
variables capture the mean difference across the groups, there is also a large variance in the 
effect, depending on which individuals from the respective groups are compared. Additionally, 
social capital formation, to a large extent, depends on the village-level physical infrastructure, 
such as roads and transportation, which exhibit great variation across villages. As in Klein and 
Vella (2009), we use the same iX  in equations (2) and (3).  
 
5.3 Exclusion restrictions-based identification 
For this identification approach, our external instrument is the number of open-access 
resources (not to be confused with common-property resources) that extreme poor households 
can access in their neighborhood. These resources include i) fallow lands, ii) water bodies 
(ponds or canals), and iii) small forests and woodlands. Fallow lands are often visited by the 
extreme poor for grazing cattle and collecting cow-dung to be used as fuel after drying. Water 
bodies, such as swamps, are visited for collecting water lilies and green leaves for food. Small 
forests and woodlands are visited for collecting dry leaves and fallen tree branches for fuel and 
firewood. These resources are privately owned, so the extreme poor cannot relocate to these 
places and establish ownership. Traditionally, in rural Bangladesh, the owners of the open-
access resources, who are usually relatively rich, allow others to use these resources without 
any formal permission, as long as the property is not damaged. From the point of instrument 
validity, it must be emphasized that extreme poor households are not concentrated, unlike 
slums in the cities, in any particular part of the village. Bangladesh is very homogenous in 
terms of language, ethnicity, and religion, with the predominant majority being Muslims. 
People, even the extreme poor, unlike the (lower caste) Hindus in either India or Nepal, are not 
concentrated based on either caste (which is prohibited in Islam) or occupation, ruling out any 
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selection in the probability of access to these resources. Additionally, open-access resources 
exhibit strong within-village variability, in that extreme poor households have variable levels 
of access to these areas, given their scattered locations within the village, and there are many 
such resources within a given settlement.   
It must be stressed that access to these resources does not create, either directly or 
indirectly, any type of self- or wage-employment for the extreme poor. Although access to 
these resources supports subsistence consumption to some extent, the livelihood of the extreme 
poor does not depend on accessing these resources. This is clearly evident from the occupations 
recorded in the survey as self-employment, as listed in Appendix A.3, which do not include 
access to any of these resources. The extreme poor interact with each other on these platforms, 
thus creating new relationships and cementing existing ties. The social capital of the extreme 
poor does not also affect the number of open-access resources, which is exogenously 
determined. One might raise the concern that extreme poor households can meet either 
potential employers or lenders in these open-access areas, because the owners of the open-
access resources might also be among either the employers or the lenders in the village. This 
would constitute a direct channel between open-access resources and the dependent variables 
outside the social capital channel. Here, we must stress again that the likelihood of the extreme 
poor meeting either potential employers or lenders in these platforms is quite low, because the 
owners of these resources do not typically either visit these places or monitor others’ visits. 
The likelihood of meeting employers or lenders in open-access resources is no different from 
the likelihood of meeting them at another spot in the village. Therefore, we rule out any reason 
for considering a direct relationship between access to open access resources and either wage-
employment or informal loans, thus violating the exclusion restriction assumption.  
Nonetheless, to block other potential avenues through which access to open resources 
might affect the outcome variables, we employ a range of covariates in the model. Thus, 
20 
 
conditional on the model covariates, our IV is likely to approximate a quasi-random experiment 
whereby the extreme poor are grouped along a single dimension in terms of their access to 
open areas, by which the social capital level of the extreme poor differs, given the extent of 
their access to these resources. Nevertheless, we take a cautious approach and interpret the 
results estimated by the IV method as a robustness check.  
 
 6 Results  
We first present the results with OLS as benchmark; this is followed by Tobit 
estimations. We then present the endogeneity-corrected results.  In all cases, we cluster the 
standard errors at the village level, given that the Monga is an aggregate shock and the village 
is the smallest unit experiencing such shocks. 
 
6.1 OLS results 
The OLS results are presented in Panel A in Table 2. The results show that help and 
invitation positively contribute to total employment. These are due to their effects on self-
employment. We do not find a significant effect of any measure of social capital on wage-
employment, except for a positive effect of invitation on male wage-employment. Moreover, 
shalish has no effect on any type of employment, yet it is the only measure of social capital 
that affects informal loans, with the effect being negative.  
The choice of control variables in the estimation is important for identification. With 
the vector of controls, such as education, land owned, and NGO membership included in the 
model, the social capital variable captures those relational factors that are orthogonal to all 
these control variables.13 Omitting some controls, such as the aforementioned three, that create 
                                                     
13 For example, higher land ownership and education would increase both information flow through 
social interactions (labor market information from a school friend, for example) and bargaining power 
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social capital does not change the main results in terms of sign and statistical significance of 
the coefficients of social capital (only its magnitude increases by 10–40%). Despite reducing 
the coefficient of social capital, these controls are essential not only for meaningful comparison 
of individuals of different types (i.e., of varying personal, family, and village characteristics) 
but also for preventing omitted variables from causing bias in the estimation. Moreover, those 
covariates are necessary for a reliable IV estimation to be able to block potential avenues for 
the violation of exclusion restrictions.  
We next estimate the benchmark specification with Tobit, given the truncation 
associated with the outcome variables. Our sample comprises households with no record of 
either employment or loans from informal sources, which might be due either to the individuals’ 
inability to obtain employment or loans, even if they attempted to, or simply to the weak supply 
side of the local economy. Since only approximately 5% of the extreme poor in the sample 
managed to obtain informal loans, we additionally estimate a probit model treating this 
outcome as binary (1 = if received any informal loan; 0 = no).  
The results estimated by the Tobit model are presented in Panel B. These are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained with OLS, with the exceptions being that shalish is now 
not significantly related to informal borrowing but is related to (female) self-employment. As 
a methodological matter, the Tobit regression is efficient, but it relies on distributional 
assumptions. The probit results are also consistent with Tobit findings (Panel C).    
    Insert Table 2 here 
 
                                                     
(as Amartya Sen notes in Development as Freedom, an educated person is “taken seriously” in social 
interactions). 
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Next, we investigate whether and how different combinations of social capital measures 
matter for the outcome variables.14 Heterogeneity might exist among the households in terms 
of total endowment of social capital.15 For example, a household may be endowed with only 
one measure of social capital, while others may be endowed with more, and even all, measures. 
Comparing the estimates across different groups, one can understand the effects of different 
intensities of social capital. To proceed, we first sum all three binary measures of social capital 
to construct an “Aggregate” measure. This measure ranges between 0 (no social capital) and 3 
(maximum). Second, we create four dummies from this “Aggregate” measure—i) households 
with no social capital, ii) households with any one component of social capital, iii) households 
with any two components of social capital, and iv) households with all three components of 
social capital. We include the last three dummies (households with no social capital as the base 
category) in the regression to compare whether larger endowment of social capital has 
incremental effects. Finally, we construct a dummy indicating whether a household is endowed 
with any social capital (1 if at least one of help, invitation, or shalish is “yes”; 0 otherwise), 
which we refer to as a “Binary Aggregate.”  
Given that both OLS and Tobit have yielded qualitatively similar results, we now 
estimate these specifications by OLS. The results are presented in Table 3. Column (2) presents 
the results for the “Aggregate” measure. The results are in line with previous OLS results, in 
that social capital has a positive effect on total and self-employment. Columns (3)–(5) report 
the results when three dummies for different intensities of social capital are included. The 
results are again similar in terms of the effect of social capital on total and self-employment, 
                                                     
14 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
 
15 Inequality in social capital among households might also arise in the event of an aggregate shock at 
the village level even households are identical in terms of other resources, such as land and human 
capital. 
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but the magnitudes of effect clearly depend on the intensities of social capital. For example, 
considering self-employment, the magnitude of the coefficients of social capital increases 
secularly from 0.184, in the case of only one component of social capital, to 0.250, in the case 
of two components of social capital, and to 0.495, in the case of all three components. Finally, 
when the Binary Aggregate index of social capital is used, the results are again consistent with 
the previous OLS results (column 6). The effect on informal loan is negative and significant 
when an individual has all three components of social capital compared with an individual with 
no social capital (column 5). 
    Insert Table 3 here 
 One important finding is that the OLS results are robust to alternative methods of 
aggregation of the three measures of social capital. Therefore, in our IV estimation, in addition 
to the three individual measures of social capital, we estimate a fourth model using the Binary 
Aggregate index. The reason for this is that the Klein–Vella heteroscedasticity-based 
identification applies to a binary and single endogenous variable. Furthermore, since we have 
one external instrument, we can correct the endogeneity of only one variable in the case of 
instrumental variables–based identification. 
 
6.2 IV results: Heteroscedasticity-based identification  
The results are summarized in Table 4. Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 present the results for 
help, invitation, shalish, and the Binary Aggregate index, respectively. Greater social capital, 
in terms of receiving help from neighbors, increases the likelihood of total and self-
employment (for both male and female members) but not wage-employment. Similarly, 
increased social capital, in terms of receiving invitation, increases the likelihood of self-
employment, especially for the female. On the other hand, the effect of attending shalish is 
more pronounced, as shalish also increases the likelihood of receiving wage-employment. For 
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example, households that have a member attending shalish in the last one year have a 18% 
higher likelihood of their members finding wage-employment than do households whose 
member did not attend shalish. The relevant likelihoods are 21% and 27% for male and female 
wage-employment, respectively, and 22% for self-employment.   
The quantitative implication of these effects for the extreme poor is very large. 
Assuming 45 days of wage work during the Monga period, and given the average daily female 
wage rate of 28.72 Taka, the monetary value of attending shalish is, on average, 349 Taka (= 
45 * 28.72 * 0.27). Given the average price of coarse rice per kilogram at the local village 
market as being 11.65 Taka at the time of survey, the increased income could buy 30 kilograms 
of coarse rice (both the female wage rate and rice price are calculated from the village level 
survey data).  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
When the Binary Aggregate index of social capital is used as the regressor, the results 
are very similar; a significant effect on self-employment and a weak effect on wage-
employment. This is understandable, because we find above that only shalish, and not either 
help or invitation, has a significant effect on wage-employment, while all three components 
have a significant effect on self-employment.  
In the case of informal loan, only attending shalish has an impact, pointing to the 
reduced likelihood of receiving informal loans.  
 
6.3 IV results: Identification based on exclusion restrictions  
Before presenting the results, we first discuss the first stage regressions of the 
endogenous variables. For all individual measures of social capital and the Binary Aggregate 
index, the coefficient of the instrument is highly significant. For example, the coefficients 
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(robust t-statistics) are 0.026 (3.36), 0.017 (2.00), 0.021 (2.96), and 0.025 (2.47) for help, 
invitation, shalish, and the Binary Aggregate index, respectively. The results suggest that open-
access resources significantly increase social capital. The F-statistics in these regressions are 
10.55, 10.85, 10.45, and 8.38, respectively, generally satisfying the rule of thumb cut-off values.  
 The IV results based on the exogenous instrument are similar to the benchmark Klein–
Vella (2010) IV results. In the case of self-employment and its disaggregation by gender, not 
only the signs and statistical significances but also the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
are very similar when using both estimation methods. However, unlike the benchmark IV 
results, but more in line with the OLS results, the instrumental variable-based effect of social 
capital on wage-employment is now positive and significant. More specifically, these are the 
effect of help on wage-employment, the effect of help and the Binary Aggregate index on male 
wage-employment, and the effect of invitation on female wage-employment. In the case of 
informal loan, the effect of help, as opposed to attending shalish in the benchmark IV 
estimation, is now negative and significant.   
 
Insert Table 5 here 
We recognize that satisfying the exclusion restriction may be difficult in practice, 
therefore, the results in this section are intended to be a verification tool for the reliability of 
the benchmark Klein–Vella (2010) IV approach. Despite the fact that these two approaches 
might rest on different sections of the data for information and differ in terms of statistical 
efficiency (i.e., Klein–Vella is less efficient than the IV method), we find that the two sets of 
results are largely comparable. This suggests that the violation of our exclusion restrictions is 
unlikely to be the case, given that the Klein–Vella method is free from such a requirement. 
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6.4 Discussions of the results  
Our results are informative about the role of the horizontal and vertical nature of 
interactions in explaining the outcome variables, even though the data cannot separate out these 
interactions ex ante, since information on the identity of individual/household who either 
extended help or invitation to visit or attend shalish was not recorded. 
We find that all three social capital components, help, invitation, and shalish, have a 
positive and significant effect on self-employment. These results can be understood by the 
horizontal nature of these social interactions among the extreme poor, as discussed in Section 
3. The extreme poor constitute the market for the products and services of small-scale self-
employment activities undertaken by the extreme poor. Greater interactions among the extreme 
poor provide better information about the market (potential customers and their locations), and, 
consequently, increase the profitability of these self-employed activities.  
On the other hand, only participation in shalish has a positive significant effect on 
wage-employment. It is worth reiterating that, out of the three components of social capital, 
only attending shalish creates an additional opportunity for the extreme poor to interact with 
the upper hierarchy in the community (rich households), thus representing the vertical aspect 
of social capital. Since potential employers of the extreme poor come from the rich households, 
rather than from other extreme poor, households endowed with this vertical component of 
social capital are more likely to be wage-employed. 
We also find that social capital has a (weak) negative effect on the probability of 
obtaining informal loans. Although this result is hard to further explain from the available data, 
it can be argued that, since greater social capital increases the likelihood of both self- and wage-
employment opportunities, households are less likely to resort to informal loans in times of 
distress during the Monga.16  
                                                     
16 We thank an Associate Editor of this journal for this explanation.  
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 7 Concluding remarks 
This paper examines the effect of an important and previously undocumented role of 
social capital in alleviating the adverse effects of the Monga, a unique type of extreme 
seasonality that occurs every year in the pre-harvesting period of the Aman crop in northern 
Bangladesh. The Monga is characterized by significantly reduced income and employment 
opportunities and is a result of either underdevelopment or total absence of labor and credit 
markets, which causes a near-famine situation for the extreme poor. This paper investigates 
employment and access to informal loans as two mechanisms through which social capital can 
help cope with hunger. The employment channel is further categorized into wage- and self-
employment. 
A key feature of our analytical approach is addressing the endogeneity of social capital, 
a problem that has been categorically ignored in the related previous work. Our main 
identification strategy relies on an innovative approach that exploits heteroscedasticity rather 
than relying on exclusion restrictions. As a robustness check, we compare the results employing 
the identification strategy based on exclusion restrictions. The heteroscedasticity-based 
benchmark results are robust to the alternative IV method. The discrepancies that we observe 
between our OLS estimates and those that are corrected for endogeneity raise concerns about 
the results of the previous literature, which left the endogeneity of social capital unaddressed.  
Our analyses document that, in the absence of other forms of capital, the extreme poor 
households with higher levels of social capital have greater success in finding wage- and self-
employment. Specifically, the vertical social network (representing an employer–employee-
type relationship) in the form of participation in shalish plays a significant role in wage-
employment. Quantifying the effect, a shalish participation increases female wage-
employment during the Monga that can be translated into 30 kilograms of coarse rice at the 
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local market price. In contrast, both horizontal and vertical social networks increase self-
employment. We also find that social capital decreases the informal borrowing during the 
Monga, probably because households with greater social capital have better self- and wage-
employment opportunities, thus relying less on informal loans to cope with the adverse effect 
of the Monga.  
The Monga is an aggregate economic shock, and individuals with higher social capital 
are likely to find employment at the expense of those with lower social capital. Therefore, in 
the present context we do not argue for a general equilibrium effect of social capital. Recent 
studies demonstrate that information, combined with insurance in the form of loans to migrate 
outside the region for employment during the Monga, has a significant impact on both income 
and consumption (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2014). Our results indicate that social 
capital partially mitigates the information problem but not the insurance problem for the 
extreme poor, thus suggesting an area of intervention.  
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Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of hh members employed  2.02 1.34 
Number of hh members wage-employed  1.02 0.81 
Number of male hh members wage-employed  0.65 0.68 
Number of female hh members wage-employed  0.37 0.58 
Number of hh members self-employed  1.00 1.16 
Number of male hh members self-employed  0.22 0.57 
Number of female hh members self-employed  0.78 0.91 
Amount of loan received (Taka) 75.63 521.01 
% of households received help from non-relative 
neighbors 
0.16 0.37 
% of households received invitation from non-relative 
neighbors 
0.27 0.44 
% of households attended shalish 0.13 0.34 
Education of the household head (years of schooling) 0.50 1.68 
Land owned by the household (acre) 0.04 0.14 
Household size 3.67 1.74 
Health condition of the household head (1= good; 0 = 
otherwise) 0.42 0.49 
If women can visit outside alone (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.01 0.08 
% of households with NGO membership 0.08 0.27 
% of the Male household head 0.65 0.48 
Age of the household head (years) 43.21 13.34 
% of the married household head 0.69 0.46 
If the village has electricity connection 0.75 0.43 
Distance of the village from all-weather road (km) 1.92 1.82 
Distance of the village from Upazilla (km) 7.57 4.02 
Average daily male wage in the village (Taka) 43.12 7.96 
Average daily female wage in the village (Taka) 29.37 6.59 
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 Table 2 The effect of social capital (individual measure) 
Indicators Help Invitation Shalish 
Panel A: OLS regression 
Total employment 0.238  0.275  0.081  
(3.04)*** (4.18)*** (1.06) 
Wage-employment 0.000 0.063 -0.003 
(0.00) (1.56) (-0.08) 
Male wage-employment -0.016 0.038* -0.014 
(-0.45) (1.62) (-0.58) 
Female wage-employment 0.016 0.025 0.011 
(0.52) (0.96) (0.39) 
Self-employment 0.238 0.212 0.085 
(2.83)*** (3.81)*** (1.36) 
Male self-employment 0.065 0.064 0.005 
(1.99)** (2.73)*** (0.19) 
Female self-employment 0.173 0.148 0.080 
(2.56)** (3.15)*** (1.52) 
Informal loan received 9.418 12.50 -32.03 
(0.48) (0.65) (-2.13)** 
Panel B: Tobit regression 
Total employment 0.252 0.292 0.096 
(3.08)*** (4.20)*** (1.17) 
Wage employment -0.008 0.069 0.014 
(-0.12) (1.37) (0.28) 
Male wage employment -0.024 0.059 0.001 
(-0.37) (1.56) (0.03) 
Female wage employment 0.028 0.057 0.012 
(0.32) (0.75) (0.15) 
Self-employment 0.377 0.345 0.184 
(3.12)*** (4.07)*** (1.98)** 
Male-self employment 0.308 0.381 0.079 
(1.91)* (3.65)*** (0.62) 
Female-self employment 0.298 0.279 0.186 
(2.72)*** (3.49)*** (2.12)** 
Informal loan received 288.2 341.8 -378.6 
(0.86) (1.22) (-1.07) 
Panel C: Probit regression 
Informal loan received 
(marginal effect) 
0.00880 
(0.967) 
0.0109  
(1.360) 
-0.00590  
(-0.658) 
Observations 4,353 4,566 4,576 
Regressions include constant and all controls. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the village level. 
***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 3 OLS regression: The effect of social capital (aggregate measure) 
Indicators Aggregate No social capital vs. Binary 
Aggregate 
  any one 
component  
any two 
components  
all three 
components  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total employment 0.175 0.240 0.290 0.530 0.264 
(5.21)*** (4.11)*** (3.92)*** (3.46) *** (4.72)*** 
Wage-employment 0.026 0.056 0.039 0.035 0.051 
(1.36) (1.69)* (0.75) (0.40) (1.69)* 
Male wage-
employment 
0.008 0.046 -0.004 -0.015 0.031 
(0.61) (1.96)* (-0.12) (-0.23) (1.47) 
Female wage-
employment 
0.018 0.011 0.044 0.050 0.020 
(1.35) (0.47) (1.32) (0.64) (1.01) 
Self-employment 0.148 0.184 0.250 0.495 0.213 
(4.87)*** (3.68)*** (3.70)*** (4.55)*** (4.32)*** 
Male self-
employment 
0.035 0.042 0.059 0.120 0.050 
(2.59)** (1.92)* (1.96)* (1.47) (2.43)** 
Female self-
employment 
0.113 0.141 0.191 0.375 0.163 
(4.34)*** (3.39)*** (3.24)*** (4.76)*** (3.93)*** 
Informal loan 
received 
0.017 8.713 12.421 -62.864 6.452 
(0.00) (0.45) (0.46) (-2.99)*** (0.37) 
Observations 4,345 4,345 4,345 4,345 4,345 
Regressions include constant and all controls. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the village level. 
***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
Aggregate social capital: Help + Invitation + Shalish (ranges from 0 to 3). 
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Table 4 IV estimation Based on Klein–Vella (2010): The effect of social capital  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indicators Help Invitation Shalish Binary 
Aggregate  
Total 
employment 
0.041 
 (9.97)*** 
0.023 
 (1.19) 
0.037 
 (8.25)*** 
0.095 (7.17)*** 
Wage 
employment 
-0.004 
 (-0.13) 
-0.025 
 (-0.86) 
0.180 
 (17.65)*** 
0.056 (1.80)* 
Male wage 
employment 
-0.001 (-0.01) 0.035 (0.92) 0.206 (12.82) *** 0.144 (1.43) 
Female wage 
employment 
-0.0003 (-0.02) -0.090 (-2.77) 0.263 (18.59) *** 0.003 (0.100) 
Self-employment 0.228 
 (20.95)*** 
0.247 
 (6.83)*** 
0.216 
 (18.45)*** 
0.325 (12.55)*** 
Male self-
employment 
0.270 (16.23)*** 0.026 (1.59) 0.281 (21.95)*** 0.180 (3.36)*** 
Female self-
employment 
0.264 (19.85)*** 0.319 (21.28)*** 0.257 (18.23)*** 0.316 (11.16)*** 
Informal loan  -0.424 (-0.63) -0.413 (-0.49) -1.027 (-1.98)* 0.311  (0.74) 
Observations 4,353 4,566 4,576 4,345 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the village level. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
Any Social capital (binary):  No social capital vs. at least one component of social capital. 
Informal loan is binary: “biprobit” estimation; marginal effects reported.  
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Table 5 IV estimation based on exclusion restrictions: The effect of social capital  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indicators Help Invitation Shalish Binary 
Aggregate 
Total 
employment 
0.042 
 (10.45)*** 
0.056 
 (5.74)*** 
0.039 
 (9.84)*** 
0.098 (6.63)*** 
Wage 
employment 
0.158 
 (7.41)*** 
0.043 
 (0.98) 
0.183 
 (19.14)*** 
0.153 (2.70)*** 
Male wage 
employment 
0.214 
 (13.34)*** 
0.025 
 (0.93) 
0.213 
 (14.90)*** 
0.225 (8.67)*** 
Female wage 
employment 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
0.220 
 (6.08)*** 
0.268 
 (20.09)*** 
0.045 (0.76) 
Self-employment 0.228 
 (20.31)*** 
0.261 
 (9.28)*** 
0.221 
 (19.80)*** 
0.326 (10.20)*** 
Male self-
employment 
0.276 
 (16.40)*** 
0.069 
 (0.36) 
0.285 
 (22.91)*** 
0.177 (2.44)** 
Female self-
employment 
0.260 
 (17.49)*** 
0.323 
 (22.90)*** 
0.264 
 (21.96)*** 
0.331 (8.09)*** 
Informal loan  -0.944* (-1.890) -0.729 (-1.056) 0.642 (0.174) -0.813 (-1.58) 
Observations 4,353 4,566 4,576 4,345 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the village level. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  
Any Social capital (binary):  No social capital vs. at least one component of social capital. 
Informal loan is binary: “biprobit” estimation; marginal effects reported.  
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Appendix 
 
A1 Comparison of some selected socio-economic indicators between the NGO-targeted 
poor and the extreme poor.  
 
Socio-economic indicators NGO-targeted 
poor 
Extreme poor*  
Average year of schooling of the 
adult members  
1.85a 0.86 
Year of schooling of the household 
head 
2.82a 0.53 
Amount of land owned (in acre) 0.87a 0.04 
Value of the living room excluding 
land (in Taka) 
7,968b 1,200 
Household using toilet (%) 20c 13.5 
Per capita calorie consumption per 
day 
2,284b Only 47.5 % of household 
can feed twice a day 
Share of fish and meat in total 
consumption (%) 
15.56b 5.77 
* The authors’ calculation from the dataset of this study;  
a  Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006); 
b  Halder (1998);  
c  Mallick (1998). 
 
A2 GDP per capita in the three northern districts of Bangladesh 
 Per capita GDP (nominal) Share of Manufacturing in 
per capita GDP (% of country  
average) 
 in Taka % of country  
average 
Kurigram 13757 74.3% 12.5% 
Nilphamari  13292 71.8% 9.7% 
Rangpur  14936 80.7% 30.1% 
Bangladesh 18511 100% 100% 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 2002. 
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A3 List of employment during Kartik month 
Types of employment Percentage 
Wage employment  
Day laborer in agriculture (including those working only for food) 21.1 
Day laborer in formal non-agricultural (such as road repairing and 
construction, including government programs for the poor)  13.1 
Day laborer in informal non-agricultural (such as restaurants, shops, informal 
workshops, sweeper)  8.5 
Housemaid 7.0 
Formal service (such as orderly that does not require formal education)  0.7 
Self-Employment  
Livestock and poultry rearing (such as cows, goats, chickens, ducks) 30.2 
Farming (vegetables)  4.2 
Farming (crops)  3.3 
Petty trade (such as fish, vegetables, fruits, spices, betel leaf, bamboo 
products, eggs, logs, honey) 4.3 
Begging 3.1 
Feriwalla (mobile trader selling door to door items, such as pots, used 
utensils, biscuits, puffed rice, sweetmeats, bangles, lace, oil) 1.5 
Semi-skilled (such as tailoring, repairing bicycles and watches, locksmith, 
blacksmith, hair dressing) 1.1 
Faria (middlemen in small trade) 0.5 
Others  0.4 
Total 100 
 
 
 
